The Eighth Air Force

The Eighth Air Force was looked upon by USAAF commanders as their prime instrument to test their doctrine of strategic bombardment. The supreme hope was that such a campaign could render massive devastation to the war industry of a highly industrialised nation, like Germany, so that it would be unable to supply and support its armed forces; in effect, bombing into submission. In the event the combined strength of all Allied strategic forces proved unable to achieve this against Germany. What strategic bombing could achieve was evinced in the spring of 1945, but that it was decisive with the weapons and delivery systems of the Hitler war, must always remain speculative.

At the end of hostilities the US Strategic Bombing Survey was produced by a large team of specialists with the object of evaluating the work of the strategic bomber: a formidable task in view of the complexity of the subject. Some of the general conclusions published were not universally accepted, but the Survey did underline its finding that air power's overall part in achieving victory in Europe was decisive.

The Eighth Air Force delivered 75% of its bombs after the Allies invaded the Continent, and it was the cumulative effect of sustained bombardment on such target systems as oil and transportation with its direct and indirect strain on German war economy, that brought the B-17s and B-24s their greatest contribution to victory.

The effect of the US heavies from the fall of 1942 until the spring of 1944, although often spectacular, was never serious enough to have profound effect. Germany's powers of recuperation were far greater than appreciated, and the small bombs carried by the B-17s and B-24s might destroy a factory building but not the precious machine tools within. Attacks against aircraft factories, even the intensive period in early 1944, saw only a temporary decline in production. On the other hand, it has been estimated that the dispersal programme instigated by the Germans in 1943 to escape the bombing possibly cost them more lost production than through actual damage to installations. In assessing the part played by the Eighth and other Allied strategic bombing forces, the considerable tying down of personnel and material in defence, both active and passive must not be overlooked. Such manpower and material might have been channelled into extra panzer divisions and so turned the scales in a land campaign.

The chief obstacle to daylight precision bombing was the inconstant weather. Cloud continually hampered and foiled attacks. Tight formations and the performance of the lead bombardier was imperative to accurate bombing, and while precision was difficult, when visibility was hampered by weather conditions, error was inevitable and sometimes frequent. The likelihood was even greater when a formation was under attack, as was illustrated on many occasions. The B-17 and B-24, the vehicles available, were far from ideal for the task in which employed, yet in the circumstances they were utilised with undeniable zeal and often with remarkable effect.

Probably the greatest single contribution of the Eighth Air Force to victory in Europe was the star part its fighters played in attaining combat superiority in continental air space. Originally furnished for bomber protection, the US fighters came to be a potent offensive weapon. Fighter and bomber operations were complementary, the bombers becoming important as bait to draw the Luftwaffe to battle, apart from their primary function.

The development of the long range fighter rested chiefly on technical and operational endeavours within the Eighth Air Force. The rapid production of a good, reliable drop-tank plus the undeterred policy of despatching single-seat, single engined fighters on, sometimes, seven hour flights in appalling weather, reaped astonishing success. By 1944 the total strength of Allied fighters was vastly superior to the Luftwaffe's, but it was predominantly the fighters of VIII Fighter Command that were able to carry the fight into Germany and achieve the air supremacy that was essential to any invasion of the Continent.

The record of the Luftwaffe against the Eighth Air Force is an inconsistent one. Like the British, the Germans were cautious in the use of bombers by day through experience in the Battle of Britain and other campaigns. When the first B-17 formations appeared over the French coast in the fall of 1942, the Luftwaffe did not foresee their activity developing into a serious threat despite difficulties in interception. Not until the B-17s struck into Germany in 1943 were fighter reinforcements forthcoming and spirited efforts made to evolve means of breaking up the US formations. The Luftwaffe was usually too preoccupied with the bombers to deal with the escort that eventually transpired, even when the P-47s appeared with drop tanks over the very borders of the Reich. The Luftwaffe's first incredible error was not to undertake determined and regular interception of the US escort in order to force them to jettison their tanks and thus restrict their range. Instead the German fighters continued to pursue the same policy with dire consequences for themselves until, with P-51 s giving near continuous escort, they found themselves the hunted and not the hunters.

A second extraordinary omission on the part of the Luftwaffe was not to press a campaign against the Eighth's bases or against bomber formations during assembly or prior to landing, in spite of success on the rare occasions when this was tried. British air defence was good but the congested East Anglian sky was ideal for intrusion with minimum risk.

While anti-aircraft guns gradually came to take a heavy toll from the US formations, the most successful means of bringing down bombers was undoubtedly the Luftwaffe's Company Front technique, evolved early in 1944 and practiced with deadly effect throughout that year by the Sturmgruppen. The heavily armed and armoured FW190s attacking as a body reduced the effectiveness of counter fire through saturation,

Although the Luftwaffe fighter force was rebuilt after June 1944 it suffered acute shortage of trained pilots and later its activities were curtailed through low fuel stocks. Its aircraft and armament of this period too were on most counts less suited to fighter-fighter combat than those of the Americans. The appearance of jet aircraft, while giving the Allied air leaders concern, did not alter the picture. The Me262s performance was high, but not such an advance over the P-51s that with artifice — the US pilots could not engage it. The Me163 did have a vastly superior performance and was rarely caught. Its appearance was limited due to development problems, chiefly its own explosive nature.

During wartime it was policy to denigrate the prowess of enemy personnel—a practice which was not confined to one side. The German fighter pilots encountered during the earlier battles with the Eighth were usually skilful and formidable opponents. In the last year of the war they were at a disadvantage in training, equipment and numbers, but despite the hopelessness of their cause and the lack of any clearly defined defensive policy on the part of the Luftwaffe administration and the Nazi hierarchy, they continued the fight with much courage.

In carrying out its mission the Eighth was aided by its location. Far enough removed from the Pentagon and government administration in the USA, it was able to enjoy a great degree of autonomy; it flourished in an environment where many of its requirements could be met locally.

Despite a certain natural impetuosity and a highly developed national pride, its officers readily acknowledged that in many instances throughout its operational existence - particularly during the early days – lack of know-how and sometimes inferior equipment necessitated the Eighth leaning heavily upon the battle-hardened expertise and facilities of others. Having survived and surmounted the initial troubles, however, it pressed forward with characteristic elan on its elected course. In this the American superiority complex played its part. Untempered by ideas of caution, the men of the Eighth Air Force pursued their concept of strategic bombardment with dogmatic faith. It was this fervour to get things done, to surmount all technical and operational obstacles, that took the Eighth further along the road it chose than ever anyone would have deemed possible. Procrastination and the negative were scorned, and even bloody experiences did not deter the overwhelming intention to succeed. This spirit percolated from the top to the bottom; each isolated combat group proclaimed itself "the best damn group in the AAF”, and in a sense, it probably was. For each was more of an enduring entity than any collection of military flying units have ever been.

The Eighth Air Force was not without its share of human failures, tactical blunders and mistaken policies. These shortcomings were, nevertheless, far outweighed by the development, to a unique degree, of such admirable characteristics as a remarkable esprit de corps, dogged bravery and supreme determination to succeed. It was, indeed, these attributes which have so rightly conferred upon the Eighth the honour of becoming one of the most famous military organisations in history.

Units of the USAAF were first Constituted — in simple language, a designation for a unit was put on the books. Activation was to bring a unit into physical existence by assigning personnel and equipment. However, because of shortages and the overloading of training facilities, many wartime activations were initially of a token nature with perhaps one officer and one enlisted man assigned. Sometimes it was purely a 'paper' activation, the order to activate was made but personnel were not assigned for some weeks. Many Eighth Air Force groups began life in this way and were often transferred 'less personnel and equipment' to another base before the first batches of men arrived to make it a physical entity.

The original cadres frequently came from old established groups which performed an amoeba act. Bomber training was in three phases; the first with emphasis on individual skills, the second was concerned with team training, and the final phase with advanced training simulating combat operations. The actual curriculum for each group varied due to a number of factors. To accelerate training of bomber units, a School of Applied Tactics was established at Orlando, Fla. and commencing with the 390th BG on 1 Mar. 43, the key men of all new groups underwent a month's intensive course there during the period of first phase training.

Movement overseas for the ground echelon, i.e., those personnel who served in an administrative and support capacity, was usually on a familiar pattern. A train journey to one of the transit camps in the New York area - Camp Kilmer or Camp Shanks - where they would await a ship to convey them to the UK. The two Cunard Queens carried the majority of Eighth Air Force personnel from New York to the Clyde estuary in Scotland. Some travelled on smaller vessels from Boston to Liverpool. The air echelon would receive its combat aircraft at the end of, or during final phase training, and move to an overseas processing station before making the flight to England. The northern ferry route was the shortest but only used during summer months. Those groups crossing during winter and spring flew by the southern route.

A crew did not know their destination until opening sealed orders on the first leg of the journey. In 1942 and 1943 the movement of many air echelons was delayed by having to await new aircraft from the factories. Both air and ground echelons of fighter groups travelled together, with few exceptions. Where a group was to fly an aircraft type which its pilots had not handled during training, the pilots were sent to OTUs on arrival in the UK, and often some high experience pilots from other units transferred to the new group.

Movement of bomber aircraft back to the US was chiefly through Valley, Wales. From there they were despatched either south to the Azores or north to Iceland depending on weather conditions but in both cases the ultimate point of arrival in US was Bradley Field, Conn. A points system allowed long serving men priority of return and to enable this a great many transfers between units took place in the UK.

Fighter groups, which were the last to be shipped, were a shadow of their former selves by the time their turn came, as most of the long-serving personnel had already departed. Aircraft with low hours were also transferred, going to units scheduled for service with occupational air forces. Once it had departed the UK a group ceased to exist as an organised formation. Its assignment to a station on arrival in the US was a paper transaction and only a few men were returned after leave to be present at its inactivation. Those units that were perpetuated as B-29 organisations were entirely new with fresh personnel.

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